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Judicata in Investor–State Arbitration 
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**
 
Abstract: As international arbitration, and investment arbitration in particular, 
becomes more prevalent, the risks of doctrinal fragmentation also increase, in 
part driven by the disparate treatment of the doctrine of res judicata throughout 
most jurisdictions, and in the arbitration context.  Notwithstanding the general 
consensus regarding the broad contours of res judicata and its firm position as 
a principle of international law, there is little agreement regarding how it is to 
be administered.  These developments threaten to undermine the international 
arbitration system, wresting from it normative legitimacy.  The U.S. common 
law version of res judicata, which is distinct from res judicata as developed in 
many civil law jurisdictions, may serve as a substantial conceptual foundation 
upon which civil law and other common law res judicata precepts may merge to 
fashion a uniform doctrine applicable in international arbitration that is 
expansive, substantive/transactional-based as to criteria, and non-formalistic in 
its application so as to avert and discourage the doctrine’s circumvention 
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Oedipus: Let it be then; have your way only if come he must, I beg of you my 
friend, do not grant them jurisdiction to rule on my fate. 
Thesus: Sir, there is no need for you to plea a second time. 
 - Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
While economic globalization has found its legal counterpart in 
international trade law, juridical globalization in the field of cross-border 
contentions is yet to arise.  The virtually monolithic configuration of 
international trade law stands in sharp relief with the fragmented body of 
principles of international public law governing investor–state arbitrations.  
 
1 SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, at 260 (F. Storr ed., Loeb Classical Library ed. 
1981) (c. 406 B.C.E.) (translation by author) (ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ: έστω δ’ ούν όπως ύμϊν φίον. 
μόνον, ξέν, είπερ κεϊνος ώδ’ ελεύσεται, μηδείς κρατείτω τής έμής ψυχής ποτε. ΘΗΣΕΥΣ: 
άπαξ τα τοιαϋτ, ούχί δίς χρήζω κλύειν, ώ πρέβυ). 
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Yet, these non-uniform and fragmented principles of private and public 
international law serve a decisive role in administering the relationship 
between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries.  Thus, their role 
is pivotal to the material effects of economic globalization.  Many 
commentators have expressed concern that as international arbitration, and 
investment arbitration in particular, becomes more prevalent, the risks of 
doctrinal fragmentation also increase, both undermining the international 
arbitration system and wresting from it normative legitimacy.  This risk is 
underscored generally by the disparate treatment of the doctrine of res 
judicata throughout most jurisdictions, and, more specifically, as the 
doctrine applies to international commercial and investor–state arbitration. 
There is a general consensus in international arbitration with respect to 
two issues:  first, arbitral tribunals universally accept the principle of res 
judicata, or claim preclusion—the principle that, once adjudicated, a claim 
cannot be raised again.  Second, arbitral tribunals accept what is referred to 
as the “triple identity” test as the determinative standard for the application 
of res judicata to a further proceeding.  The triple identity test in res judicata 
prevents relitigation of claims (1) between the same parties (2) regarding 
the same subject matter, and (3) on the same legal grounds.
2
  Because of the 
ostensible simplicity of the triple identity test, together with the 
international adoption of the doctrine, one might reach the misguided 
proposition that the current formulation of the res judicata doctrine as 
applied in international arbitration is not meaningfully or materially 
wanting.  Such an assumption, however, obfuscates the multiple salient 
problems that command the fashioning of the application of a uniform 
doctrine applicable to international arbitration. 
At the very outset, there is a lack of uniformity in the application of the 
doctrine because judicial tribunals, understandably as an expression of 
sovereignty, apply fixed rules of res judicata to a specific jurisdiction for 
purposes of determining the effect of an award on a further proceeding.
3
  
The doctrine of res judicata, however, varies—often materially—among 
states and different legal systems, thus hampering application of the 
doctrine in the context of international arbitration in ways that would 
preserve and foster uniformity. 
While certainly arbitral tribunals are not required to apply a doctrine of 
 
2  Generally, but far from universally, the triple identity test proscribes a further 
proceeding between (i) the same parties, (ii) arising from the identical transaction or causes 
of action, and (iii) seeking the same relief.  See Int’l Law Ass’n, Berlin Conference, Berlin, 
China, 2004, International Commercial Arbitration Interim Report: “Res judicata” and 
Arbitration, 2.  See also Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 
7 & 8, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 23 (dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti). 
3 This use of res judicata with the aim of proscribing a further or subsequent contention is 
often referred to as “negative res judicata” as opposed to “positive res judicata,” which 
concerns the use of an award to enforce its terms.  This contribution shall be limited only to 
analysis of “negative res judicata.” 
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res judicata in the same manner as national courts, it is evident that the 
manner in which res judicata is applied by arbitral tribunals and to arbitral 
awards may not be altogether severed from the elements of the res judicata 
doctrine that municipal courts apply to judgments, notwithstanding the 
uniquely salient features of international arbitration—namely, that it is 
bottomed on a private foundation for jurisdiction,
4
 removed from a 
sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty, its emphasis on a consensual precept in 
the selection of arbitrators (decision makers), and its reliance on 
institutional internationalized procedures, the applicability of which are also 
founded on party-autonomy, and a consensual arrangement. 
The U.S. common law version of res judicata may serve as a 
substantial conceptual bastion from which civil law and common law res 
judicata precepts may merge in fashioning a uniform doctrine that is 
expansive, substantive/transactional-based as to criteria, and non-formalistic 
in its application so as to avert and discourage the doctrine’s circumvention 
through the use of legal fictions.  This expansive version of the doctrine is 
particularly well suited to address the complexities of applying res judicata 
in the context of investor–state arbitration. 
Following a succinct introduction that traces the contours of the 
origins of res judicata in international law, including references to the 
precedent and Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a detailed 
discussion of the fragmented system of res judicata ensues in Section III.  
This analysis will include a review of the civil law and common law 
approaches to the doctrine, with particular attention placed on the approach 
adopted in United States jurisprudence.  A review of the application of this 
doctrine in the context of international arbitration, including investor–state 
arbitration, follows in Section IV.  Finally, emerging issues in investor–
state arbitration that implicate the development of res judicata in that arena 
shall be considered. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF PRECEDENT AND RES JUDICATA IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
This paper begins with a consideration of the origins of the doctrine of 
res judicata in international law, including the development of its 
acceptance.  The Statute of the ICJ and the ample precedent that this 
international judicial body has generated provide a vast source of 
 
4 This “private” foundation is cognizable in investor–state arbitration pursuant to the 
“offer-acceptance” theory of consent arising from a national investor-protection statute that 
serves as an offer that in turn may be deemed accepted, among different ways, by the 
actually filing of an arbitration demand.  See David D. Caron, The Interpretation of National 
Foreign Investment Laws as Unilateral Acts Under International Law, in LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN, 649, 649 
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011). 
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substantial authority.  Indeed, in a 1954 ICJ case, res judicata was 
recognized as a “well-established and generally recognized principal of 
law.”
5
  This conclusion follows the precedent established—in dissent—by a 
distinguished Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) jurist, Judge 
Dionisio Anzilotti, who observed that res judicata was among the “general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations.”
6
  The significance of the 
specific language that the ICJ and its predecessor the PCIJ adopted arises 
from the terms of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 




As is readily discernible, the normative use of the doctrine of res 
judicata by ICJ tribunals directly rests on the determination that the doctrine 
is a “general principle[] of law recognized by civilized nations,” a 
determination which, over eighty years since Judge Anzilotti’s famous 
exegesis, is firmly fixed in the firmament of international jurisprudence, 
including that of numerous recently issued international arbitral tribunals.  
However, as shall be detailed, notwithstanding the general consensus 
regarding the broad contours of the doctrine and its firm position as a 
principle of international law, there is little agreement regarding how it is to 
be administered. 
III.  THE FRAGMENTED CONFIGURATION OF RES JUDICATA 
Despite the apparent uniformity with respect to the viability of res 
judicata in international law, and the general agreement that this doctrine is 
best administered through the application of the triple identity test, there is 
in fact virtually no agreement as to how any of the three prongs of that test 
should be applied in practice.  Because of the universal acceptance of the 
doctrine’s general contours, it is unsettling and deeply problematic that 
there is so much dissonance concerning the doctrine’s application.  Analysis 
 
5 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53 (July 13). 
6 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 & 8, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 13, at 27 (dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti). 
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38. 
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of national law, including—broadly speaking—the codifications adopted in 
numerous civil law jurisdictions and the United States common law, renders 
several readily identifiable categories of res judicata that are hardly 
harmonized.  As we shall demonstrate, these rubrics can be categorized as 
being either formalistic or substantive/transactional.  This article contends 
that it is the latter that is most compatible with the juridical globalization of 
international commercial arbitration and investor–state arbitration. 
A.  The Civil Law Approach 
Although res judicata has been codified in most civil law jurisdictions 
in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, rudimentary elements of the 
doctrine are not uniformly articulated, let alone expansively applied.  Each 
individual civil law jurisdiction administers its own unique version of the 
doctrine, typically pursuant to a methodology that emphasizes legal 
formalism extremely narrow in scope.  These narrow, formalistic 
applications of the doctrine are, therefore, ill-suited to the broad, complex 
legal arrangements that characterize transnational commerce in a global 
economy.  An analysis of the res judicata provisions adopted by several 
civil law jurisdictions reflects a significant lack of uniformity with respect 
to each prong of the triple identity test.  Nevertheless, despite the numerous 
differences, the narrow, formalistic approach to the doctrine’s application 
appears to be pervasive. 
With respect to the first prong of the triple identity test, which requires 
the identity of the parties to be the same, the jurisdictions analyzed can be 
divided into four identifiable categories.  First, the applicable code of some 
jurisdictions only references “the same party.”
8
  Second, other jurisdictions 
even further limited conceptually the first prong by identifying “the same 
parties in the same or identical capacities.”
9
  A third category applies “the 
same parties and heirs” test, arguably adopting a more expansive approach 
 
8 See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 301 (Braz.):  “Uma 
ação é idêntica à outra quando tem as mesmas partes, a mesma causa de pedir e o mesmo 
pedido.” [“An action is identical to another when they have the same parties, the same cause 
of action, and the same request.”] 
9 See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1351 (Fr.):  
 
L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet du 
jugement.  Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit 
fondée sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée 
par elles et contre elles en la même qualité.  [The authority of res judicata does 
not occur only with respect to the subject of the judgment.  It is necessary that the 
thing sought is the same, that the application is based on the same cause; that the 
application is between the same parties, and formed by them and against them in 
the same capacity.] 
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to the doctrine’s application.
10
  Fourth, in some jurisdictions, the first prong 
has been crafted as pertaining to “the same parties” (an explicit provision 
for no third parties), leaving no doubt as to the narrow and formal 




10 See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [CÓD. PROC. CIV.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE 
CODE] art. 177 (Chile): 
 
La excepción de cosa juzgada puede alegarse por el litigante que haya obtenido 
en el juicio y por todos aquellos a quienes según la ley aprovecha el fallo, 
siempre que entre la nueva demanda y la anteriormente resuelta haya: 
1. Identidad legal de personas; 
2. Identidad de la cosa pedida; y 
3. Identidad de la causa de pedir. 
Se entiende por causa de pedir el fundamento inmediato del derecho deducido en 
juicio. 
 
[The doctrine of res judicata may be invoked by the litigant who has obtained a 
judgment at trial and all those who, by law, are included in the decision whenever 
the new claim and the previous result share:  
 
1. Legal identity of persons; 
2. Identity of the thing asked; and 
3. Identity of the cause of action 
 
Cause of action refers to the immediate legal grounds decided in the previous 
judgment.] 
 
11 See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVILCODE] arts. 469–70 (Braz.): 
 
Art. 469 - Não fazem coisa julgada: 
(I) os motivos, ainda que importantes para determinar o alcance da 
parte dispositiva da sentença; 
(II) a verdade dos fatos, estabelecida como fundamento da sentença; 
(III) a apreciação da questão prejudicial, decidida incidentemente no 
processo. 
Art. 470 - Faz, todavia, coisa julgada a resolução da questão prejudicial, se a 
parte o requerer (arts. 5º e  325), o juiz for competente em razão da matéria e 
constituir pressuposto necessário para o julgamento da lide. 
 
[Article 469 – Res Judicata does not apply to: 
 
(I) the rationale, except that which is important to determine or advance the 
dispositive portion of the judgment; 
(II) the true facts, established as the foundation of the sentence; 
(III) consideration of the question, incidentally decided in the process. 
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A strict “same party” scheme leaves room for subsidiary or affiliate 
corporate entities to circumvent res judicata finality.  Similar 
gamesmanship is readily available with respect to representatives, agents, 
principals, and other similar legal fictions.  Likewise, pursuant to this 
rubric, an individual in her or his personal capacity in the first action and as 
the solitary shareholder of a corporation in the further proceeding would 
theoretically be able to challenge quite meaningfully the doctrine’s 
application. 
The second prong of the triple identity test suffers from want of 
uniformity and excessive formality.  A number of the jurisdictions analyzed 
seemed to define the second prong of the triple identity test as the “same 
cause of action.”
12
  Others focused on what might best be characterized as 
the “same underlying occurrence or transaction.”
13
  In a third category, the 
language was inconclusive for purposes of definitively identifying whether 




Article 470 – It is, however, res judicata the resolution of the certified question, if the 
part requires it (arts. 5 and 325), the court has jurisdiction in the matter and provide the 
necessary presupposition for the trial of the suit.] 
 
12 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). 
13 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1351 (Fr.):  
 
L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet du 
jugement.  Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit 
fondée sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée 
par elles et contre elles en la même qualité.  [The authority of res judicata does 
not take place only with respect to the subject of the judgment.  It is necessary 
that the thing sought is the same; that the application is based on the same cause; 
that the application is between the same parties, and formed by them and against 
them in the same capacity.] 
 
14 See, e.g., CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 123 (Peru): 
 
Una resolución adquiere la autoridad de cosa juzgada cuando: 
1. No proceden contra ella otros medios impugnatorios que los ya 
resueltos; o 
2. Las partes renuncian expresamente a interponer medios 
impugnatorios o dejan transcurrir los plazos sin formularlos. 
 
La cosa juzgada sólo alcanza a las partes y a quiénes de ellas deriven sus 
derechos. Sin embargo, se puede extender a los terceros cuyos derechos 
dependen de los de las partes o a los terceros de cuyos derechos dependen de los 
de las partes, si hubieran sido citados con la demanda. 
 
La resolución que adquiere la autoridad de cosa juzgada es inmutable, sin 
perjuicio de lo dispuesto en los Artículos 178 y 407. 
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Finally, none of the jurisdictions studied specified the particular type 
of relief that would give rise to satisfaction of the third prong of the test.  
Practically all identified the relief sought as “the same objective or 
object.”
15
  Under this formulation, a formalistic, non-
substantive/transactional approach to the application of this third prong is 
problematic.  By way of example, a strict application of the civil law 
codified doctrine generally would defeat application of the res judicata 
doctrine where the first action alleged prohibitory injunctive relief and the 
further proceeding averred mandatory injunctive relief.  Similar nuanced 
and less subtle machinations concerning the prayer for relief can be devised 
without much challenge to the imagination with respect to, for example, 
specific performance.  As to a straightforward pecuniary/quantum 
application for damages, the ambiguity in the second prong—underlying 
transaction/cause of action—can certainly justify non-application of the 
doctrine merely by ascribing the damages petitioned in the further action as 
arising from a different cause of action distinct from that asserted in the first 
proceeding and predicated on a part of the underlying occurrence or 




[A judgment acquires the authority of res judicata when: 
 
1.  No other challenges other than those already resolved are pending 
against it; or 
2.  The parties expressly waive any further challenges or permit 
deadlines to pass without being acted upon. 
 
Res judicata extends only to the parties and those who derive their rights 
therefrom. However, it can be extended to third parties whose rights depend on 
the rights of the parties or to third parties whose rights depend on the parties, if 
they had been summoned to the lawsuit. 
 
The resolution that acquires the authority of res judicata is immutable, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 178 and 407.] 
 
15 See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 23 (Belg.). 
L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet de la 
decision. Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit fondée 
sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée par 
elles et contre elles en la même qualité. [The authority of res judicata does occur 
only with respect to the subject of the decision.  It is necessary that the thing 
sought is the same; that the application is based on the same cause; that the 
application is between the same parties, and formed by them and against them in 
the same capacity.] 
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B.  The U.S. Common Law Approach 
The common law res judicata regime stands in stark contrast with its 
civil law counterpart.  The common law res judicata construct is materially 
less formal and, therefore, significantly more expansive.  Thus, it 
meaningfully amplifies the doctrine’s application. 
1.  Common Law Public Policy 
Contrary to the majority of civil law jurisdictions, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. United States,
16
 
set forth two tenets upon which res judicata as a juridical doctrine 
constituted an integral part of judicial public policy.  First, the Court 
observed that “[t]his general rule [res judicata] is demanded by the very 
object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the 
peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial 
determination.”
17
  Second, it was observed that:  
 
[the] enforcement [of res judicata] is essential to the maintenance 
of social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be 
invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property if, as 
between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the 
judgments of such tribunals concerning all matters properly placed 
at issue, and actually determined by them.
18
   
 
The Court supplemented these two policy precepts by recognizing that a 
fundamental objective of the doctrine is “[t]o preclude parties from 
contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple 
lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action 
by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”
19
 
Consonant with its status as a matter of public policy, however, res 
judicata, contrary to the majority of civil law jurisdictions, may be raised 
 
16 168 U.S. 1, 18 (1897). 
17 Id. at 48. 
18 Id. 
19 See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1042–43 (1971); Allan D. Vestal, 
Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L.J. 857, 858 (1965).  This 
staunchly entrenched public policy status notwithstanding, the U.S. common law res judicata 
scheme contemplates waiver of the doctrine’s applications if not timely raised by a party.  
See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410 (2000) (“We disapprove the notion that a 
party may wake up because a ‘light finally dawned’ years after the first opportunity to raise a 
defense [of res judicata] and effectively raise it so long as the party was (though no fault of 
anyone else) in the dark until his late awakening.”); see also Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 
F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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sua sponte by a court of competent jurisdiction.
20
  A predicate to judicial 
initiative of this sort is that the Court must be “on notice that it has 
previously decided the issue presented . . . even though the defense [res 
judicata] has not been raised.”
21
 
The common law public policy standing of res judicata also adopts the 
time-honored tradition and general rule that a party “is not bound by 
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as party 
or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”
22
 
2.  The U.S. Common Law “Triple Identity” Test 
The triple identity test is an integral part of the U.S. common law res 
judicata doctrine. Despite multiple iterations of the test over time and in the 
development of jurisprudence, a key recitation of the test provides that: 
a right, question, or fact, distinctly put in issue, and directly 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of 
recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same 
parties or their privies; and, even if the second suit is for a different 
cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, 
as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively 




The “sameness” or “identity” predicate, which arguably promotes a 
broad application of the doctrine, finds eloquent expression in no fewer 
than six exceptions to the rule against non-party claim preclusion, which 
considerably temper the seemingly limiting character of the first prong 
same party element.  These exceptions are wholly foreign to civil law 
jurisdictions. 
The first exception provides that “[a] person who agrees to be bound 
by the determination of issues in an action between others is bound in 
accordance with the terms of his agreement.”
24
 Two examples of this 
situation would be indemnity and insurance arrangements. 
A second exception arises from preexisting juridical relationships 
between the person to be bound and the party to the judgment.
25
  These 
relationships would include assignee and assignor, bailee and bailor, and 




20 Arizona, 530 U.S. at 412. 
21 Id. 
22 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969). 
23 S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897). 
24 DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 77–78 (2001); see 
also California v. Texas, 459 U.S. 1096, 1097 (1983). 
25 See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996). 
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§43–44, §52, §55 (1982); see also Taylor 
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A third exception arises where a non-party who was “adequately 
represented by someone with the same interests who [was] a party” to the 
suit, and, therefore, the non-party may be bound by the judgment in the first 
action.
27
  Examples of representative actions that may have preclusive effect 
on non-parties are (i) class actions, (ii) suits filed against trustees, (iii) 
actions against guardians, and (iv) proceedings against fiduciaries.
28
 
Fourth, where a non-litigant assumes control over a litigation in which 




The fifth exception is triggered where a party seeks to re-litigate a case 
through a proxy.  Preclusion attaches when a party who did not participate 
in the first-filed action files a claim as the designated representative of a 
person who was a party in the first-adjudicated proceeding.
30
 
The sixth exception is found where specific statutory enactments 




For the sake of being comprehensive, it should be noted that in 2008 
the Supreme Court abolished a “virtual representation” exception to the 
non-party exception preclusion that primarily had been developed by the 
Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals.
32
  Patently contradicting 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Richards,
33
 these circuit courts relied upon 
a multifactor standard for virtual representation that allowed for non-party 
 
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“These exceptions originated ‘as much from the 
property law as from the values of preclusion by judgment.’”). 
27 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 881 (citing Richards, 517 U.S. at 798). 
28 Richards, 517 U.S. at 798. 
29 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979).  In this case the Supreme Court 
found that the subject non-party bound by the judgment, the United States, had an active role 
in: 
(i)  requiring the first suit to be filed, 
(ii)  reviewing and approving the complaint, 
(iii)  assuming responsibility for attorney’s fees and costs, 
(iv)  strategizing and directing an appeal from a State District Court to a State 
Supreme Court, 
(v)  entering an appearance and submitting a brief in the capacity of amicus before 
a State Supreme Court, 
(vi)  directing the filing of a notice of appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
(vii)  causing petitioner abandonment of judicial appeal pursuant advice of the 
Solicitor General of the United States. 
Id.  Montana suggests that the standard for “controlling a proceeding” entails a totality of 
circumstances analysis.  Id. 
30 Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 620–23 (1926). 
31 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989). 
32 See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 880. 
33 517 U.S. at 793. 
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preclusion in cases beyond the six exceptions identified.
34
 
The U.S. common law second prong of the triple identity test—cause 
of action or subject matter—is similarly broader than that of its civil law 
counterpart.  Specifically, while the standard res judicata triple identity test 
recitation merely states that “a final judgment on the merits bars further 
claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action,”
35
 res 
judicata precludes re-litigation of all causes of action, defenses, and 
affirmative defenses that were available to a litigant in the first action but 
not raised at that time.
36
  This framework, which extends to causes of action 
not even raised in the first proceeding, let alone not identical to those 
asserted in the further action, is both theoretically and practically alien to 
the triple identity test examined in civil law jurisdictions.  This expansive 
approach furthers the policy of finality that res judicata seeks to accomplish 
by virtue of focusing on the actual substantive and transactional 
configuration of the proceedings instead of relying on the narrow and 
formalistic mechanics that undermine the doctrine. 
3.  Collateral Estoppel 
The schism between civil and common law jurisdictions is 
substantially enhanced by the U.S. common law doctrine of collateral 
estoppel and the multiple nuances that define the doctrine.  The collateral 
estoppel nomenclature, for example, has been used to define the res judicata 
effect against a non-party.  In Montana v. United States, for example, the 
Supreme Court observed that “preclusion of such non-parties falls under the 
rubric of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata because the latter 
doctrine presupposes identity between causes of action.”
37
 These references 
notwithstanding, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments treats res judicata 
as “claim preclusion” and collateral estoppel as “issue preclusion.”
38
  
“Defensive collateral estoppel” constitutes an occurrence where a defendant 
attempts to proscribe a plaintiff from re-litigating an issue that the plaintiff 
previously had litigated unsuccessfully in a prior action against the same or 
a different party.
39
  Moreover, offensive collateral estoppel has been defined 
as instances where a plaintiff aspires to foreclose a defendant from re-
litigating an issue that the defendant previously had unsuccessfully litigated 
 
34 While the Sixth Circuit in Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
143 F.3d 415, 423 (6th Cir. 1999), held that “virtual representation” was no broader than 
“adequate representation” as the Supreme Court had defined in Richards, the test enunciated 
by the Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, amplified the Supreme Court’s holding in Richards.  
This conflict between the Circuits and the Supreme Court was expressly and directly laid to 
rest by the Court in Taylor.  See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894. 
35 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). 
36 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). 
37 Montana, 440 U.S. at 154. 
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27 (1982). 
39 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979). 
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in a prior proceeding against the same or a different party.
40
 
Collateral estoppel may apply either to issues of fact or law and 
application of the doctrine is triggered by the triple identity test.
41
  As with 
res judicata, collateral estoppel does not require exact identity of the parties.  




Notably, the doctrine of estoppel recognizes an exception for 
“unmixed questions of law” in successive actions involving substantially 
unrelated claims.
43
  Here the adjective “unmixed” and the adverb 
“substantially” are paramount.  Even though preclusive effect conclusively 
attaches in a further litigation to issues of fact or law that were raised or that 
could have been raised in a prior proceeding, an exception is amply 
recognized where, in deciding a case, a court has articulated a rule or 
principle of law; a party to a subsequent proceeding—upon a different 
demand—is not estopped from arguing that the law is otherwise..
44
  This 
exception, however, is limited only to cases where a pure legal issue was 
pronounced in the first action (an unmixed question of law) and contested 
in a subsequent proceeding that must be based upon a different demand:  
“[b]ut a fact, question, or right distinctly adjudged in the original action 
cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination 




The U.S. common law doctrine of collateral estoppel carves out yet 
another distinction that still furthers the gap between common and civil law 
doctrine on preclusion that, in turn, is applicable to international arbitration.  
The doctrine of collateral estoppel amply broadens the scope of this 
 
40 See Alfred J. Weisbrod, Offensive Collateral Estoppel, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 257, 
257–58 (1983). 
41 Montana, 440 U.S. at 154–55. 
42 See, e.g., In Re Gottheiner, 703 F. 2d. 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1983); see also 
Stratosphere Litigation LLC v. Grand Casinos, 298 F.3d 1137, 1142 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding privity when a party is “so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that 
he represents precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter involved”); Shaw v. 
Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding privity when the interests of the party 
in the subsequent action were shared with and adequately represented by the party in the 
former action); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d. 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(“[A] ‘privy’ may include those whose interests are represented by one with authority to do 
so.”). 
43 See Montana, 440 U.S. at 163. 
44 This is underscored by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and its related jurisprudence, which 
precludes the imposition of sanctions on a party who in good faith argues for “an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.”  See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs 
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986). 
45 United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924) (emphasis added). This exception is 
commonly referred to as the “Moser Exception” based upon the style of the seminal case on 
this point. 
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preclusive effect as to both legal and factual premises upon which the actual 
ruling is predicated.  Therefore, the likelihood of forum shopping and 
strategic gamesmanship—seeking “a second bite at the apple”—is 
measurably and substantially curtailed.  In this regard, the fundamental 
tenets of international arbitration (party autonomy, uniformity, transparency 
of standard, efficiency, and finality) are both furthered and achieved.  The 
substantive/transactional rubric of the U.S. common law preclusion 
doctrine, despite its multiple exceptions and subtleties, is a clearly defined 
system that militates towards uniformity in this otherwise fragmented field.  
What we urge here is not the unbridled wholesale engrafting of U.S. 
common law res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrine on international 
commercial and investor–state arbitration. Instead, we suggest something 
considerably more modest and less bold; we underscore the possible virtues 
of a substantive/transactional approach that transcends boilerplate 
application of extremely narrow and formalistic precepts that are conducive 
to a disparate and fragmented rubric of preclusion doctrine that further 
invites the circumvention of res judicata.  Along these lines, the exigency of 
a substantive/transactional standard governing res judicata is highlighted 
and rendered all the more apparent in a context of international dispute 
resolution that is yet to fashion a universally accepted doctrine of binding 
precedent or stare decisis.
46
 
IV.  ADDRESSING RES JUDICATA IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 
The very exigent and fundamental inquiry as to the manner in which 
res judicata should apply to treaty-based arbitration is yet to be determined.  
Indeed, this critical issue has been the subject matter of scant commentaries 
despite a plethora of authority recognizing res judicata as a settled and 
important principle of public international law.  It cannot, however, be 
considered in a vacuum, but rather must be placed in the context of the 
broader discussion regarding precedent in international commercial and 
investor–state arbitration, a subject with respect to which considerable ink 
has been spilled.
47
  Several categories of concern readily can be identified, 
including instances in which international arbitration tribunals sharply have 
 
46 Obviously, the theoretical and mechanical application of the res judicata and collateral 
estoppel doctrines are not without their own difficulties.  To cite one illustrative example, the 
scope of the Moser Exception often presents difficulties in delineation, most notably where 
there is partial congruence in the subject matter of the further disputes.  These challenges 
notwithstanding, if uniformity in the application of res judicata is to be taken seriously, it 
follows that questions of public policy, waiver, reform of the triple-identity test, and scope as 
to the dispositive certainly do stand to benefit from a cross-cultural and a cross-system study 
of the doctrine with emphasis on those systems that stress an expansive substantive criteria. 
47 See, e.g., Tai-Hend Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014 (2006–07); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of 
Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010). 
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differed with respect to the interpretation of most-favored nation clauses,
48
 
the scope of umbrella clauses,
49
 the meaning of “investment,”
50
 the 
elements of binding consent arising from national legislation on investment 
protection,
51
 and the definition of “state of necessity.”
52
  Indeed, even the 
very existence of international minimum standards is debated.
53
 
One scholar described these divergences as among the “dangers” of the 
“proliferation of investment arbitration.”
54
  These situations are profoundly 
troubling to the extent that they involve direct conflicts with respect to 
substantive issues that are likely to arise again in future arbitrations.  They 
 
48 Compare, e.g., Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002) with Plama 
Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, (Feb. 8, 2005), 44 ILM 721 (2005). 
49 Compare, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Aug. 6, 2003), 18 ICSID 
Rev.-FILJ 301 (2003), 42 ILM 1290 (2003) with SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. 
v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan. 
29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 515 (2004). 
50 Compare, e.g., Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, ¶¶ 13.5–13.6 
(Nov. 27, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 483 (2006) with Salini Costrutorri, S.p.A. v. Kingdom of 
Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 
609 (2003). 
51 Compare, e.g., Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Apr. 14, 1988) with 
Československa Obchodní Banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 35–6 and 46 (May 24, 1999); Zhinvali 
Development Ltd. v. Republic of  Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, Award,  ¶339, (Jan. 
24, 2003). 
52 Compare CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, (May, 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005) with LG&E Energy Corp., 
LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 ILM 40 (2007).  Indeed, the confusion 
with respect to the interpretation of state of necessity was exacerbated by the decision of the 
ad hoc committee in Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Annulment Decision, (June 29, 2010), 49 I.L.M. 1445 (2010). 
53 See Maximo Romero Jiminez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
244 (2001); see also Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of 
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (2003).  In this 
connection, at least pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 1105, one NAFTA tribunal affirms that 
irrespective of the ongoing debate concerning the existence of international minimum 
standards and the extent to which it applies at all, the doctrine exists at least with respect to 
NAFTA’s signatories, the United States, Mexico, and Canada.  See ADF Group Inc. v. 
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (NAFTA), Award, ¶ 179, (Jan. 9, 2003) (The 
tribunal observed that the relevant provision in NAFTA on international minimum standards, 
Article 1105(b), “clarifies that so far as the three NAFTA Parties are concerned, the long-
standing debate as to whether there exists such a thing as a minimum standard of treatment 
of non-nationals and their property prescribed in customary international law, is closed.”). 
54 See August Reinisch, The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION: 
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF GERHARD HAFNER 107, 114 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008). 
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are particularly disturbing when they arise, as in the state of necessity 
context, when the different disputes involve the same respondents.
55
  
Nevertheless, these concerns pale in comparison with the circumstance 
discussed below:  divergent holdings in parallel proceedings arising from 
the same underlying facts and involving the same parties. 
A.  The Czech Republic Cases: Lauder and CME 







 arbitrations against the Czech 
Republic (the “Czech Republic Cases”) compellingly illustrate the need for 
a sensible approach to res judicata and lis pendens
59
 in the context of 
international arbitration.  While the precedents referenced in the previous 
section represent instances in which arbitral tribunals have diverged with 
respect to the interpretation of BIT provisions in different cases—a 
troubling pathology, indeed—the Czech Republic Cases are quite 
remarkable in that the two arbitral tribunals reached strikingly different 
conclusions in what was substantively the very same dispute. 
The core issues in both arbitral proceedings arose from a rather 
complex dispute relating to the management and ownership of a recently 
privatized television network in the Czech Republic.  The first of these 
proceedings, Lauder, was initiated on August 19, 1999 pursuant to the BIT 
between the Czech Republic and the United States, of which Mr. Lauder 
was a citizen.
60
  During the pendency of the Lauder proceeding, on 
February 22, 2000, CME Czech Republic B.V., a Dutch company 
controlled by Mr. Lauder, also initiated a proceedings against the Czech 
 
55 See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002); Plama Consortium Ltd. 
v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb. 8, 
2005), 44 ILM 721 (2005).  These cases illustrate this same point with respect to conflicting 
precedent regarding most-favored nation doctrine involving the very same plaintiff. 
56 Reinisch, supra note 54, at 116.  Another commentator, perhaps more diplomatically, 
referred to the cases as being “the object of severe criticism.”  See Bernardo M. Cremades & 
Ignacio Madalena, Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L 507, 
515 (2008). 
57 Lauder v. Czech Republic, 14 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 3 at 35 
(UNCITRAL 2001). 
58 CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 15 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 4 at 
83 (UNICITRAL 2003) [hereinafter CME, Final Award]; see also CME v. Czech Republic, 
Partial Award, 14 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 3 at 109 (UNICITRAL 2001) 
[hereinafter CME, Partial Award]. 
59 Though conceptually similar to res judicata, lis pendens applies when the parallel 
proceedings are ongoing.  Res judicata, in contrast, relates to the binding and preclusive 
effects of completed proceedings.  See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTY–
FIRST CONFERENCE HELD IN BERLIN 1 (2004); INT’L LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTY–
SECOND CONFERENCE HELD IN TORONTO 1 (2006). 
60 CME, Final Award, supra note 58, at ¶ 5. 
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Republic under the BIT between the Czech Republic and the Netherlands.
61
  
The two arbitrations proceeded in parallel until September 3, 2001, when 
the tribunal in Lauder issued its Final Award in which it concluded that the 
Czech Republic bore no liability for its acts.
62
  A mere ten days later, on 
September 13, 2001, the tribunal in the CME arbitration issued a Partial 
Award in which the tribunal reached exactly the opposite result, concluding 
that the Czech Republic was liable for its breach of the Czech-Dutch BIT.
63
  
In its Final Award, issued on March 14, 2003, the CME tribunal imposed 
nearly $270 million in damages on the Czech Republic.
64
  Although the 
Czech Republic had instituted vacatur proceedings before Swedish courts 
not long after the issuance of the Partial Award in CME (the CME tribunal 
was seated in Stockholm), this petition was not resolved until May 15, 
2003, when the Swedish Court of Appeal rejected the motion.
65
 
Both the CME and Lauder tribunals dispatched arguments relating to 
the res judicata or lis pendens effects of the parallel arbitral proceeding.  
Each tribunal, after engaging in highly formalistic triple identity analysis, 
perhaps not surprisingly reached the same result.
66
  Acknowledging that 
international tribunals have accepted the triple identity test for res judicata, 
the CME tribunal rightfully stated that it requires “the ‘same’ dispute, 
identical parties, the same subject matter, and the same cause of action.”
67
  
However, several paragraphs before describing the test that it would apply, 
the tribunal had already outlined its conclusion: 
The parties in the [Lauder] Arbitration differ from the parties in this 
arbitration. Mr. Lauder is the controlling shareholder of CME Media 
Ltd, whereas in this arbitration a Dutch holding company being part 
of the CME Media Ltd Group is the Claimant.  The two arbitrations 
are based on differing bilateral investment treaties, which grant 
comparable investment protection, which, however, is not 
identical. . . .Because the two bilateral investment treaties create 
 
61 See id. 
62 See Lauder, supra note 57, ¶ 407, at 107–08.  Notably, although the tribunal chose not 
to impose liability on the Czech Republic, it nevertheless concluded that it had breached the 
U.S.–Czech BIT.  Id. 
63 CME, Partial Award, supra note 58, ¶ 624, at 286–87. 
64 CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶¶ 648–49, at 243. 
65 Svea hovrätt [Court of Appeals] 2003-3-15 T8735-01 (Swed.) translated in 15 WORLD 
TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 5 at 171 (2003). 
66 It should be noted that in addition to the triple-identity analysis, both tribunals also 
engaged in a waiver analysis, which also justified the decision to move forward on the basis 
of the Czech Republic’s alleged refusal to agree to the consolidation of the two arbitrations.  
See CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶¶ 426–30, at 181–82; see also Lauder, supra note 
57, ¶ 173, at 69.  In addition, the CME tribunal also grounded its conclusion that the Czech 
Republic had waived any res judicata arguments on the formalistic ground that, rather than 
specifically invoking res judicata, the Czech Republic instead invoked the argument of 
“abuse of process.”  See CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 431, at 182. 
67 CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 435, at 183. 
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The tribunal neglected to mention that the claimant “Dutch holding 
company,” that it referred to as merely “being part of the CME Media Ltd 
Group” (CME Czech Republic B.V.) was the undisputed controlling party 
of the CME Media Ltd Group.
69
  Thus, although the distinction surely 
existed in form, it remains questionable to what extent it existed in 
substance. 
The tribunal in Lauder went one step further than the CME tribunal as 
it willfully suspended disbelief: 
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the Respondent’s recourse to the 
principle of lis alibi pendens to be of no use, since all the other court 
and arbitration proceedings involve different parties and different 
causes of action. . . . [N]o possibility exists that any other court or 
arbitral tribunal can render a decision similar to or inconsistent with 
the award which will be issued by this Arbitral Tribunal, i.e., that the 
Czech Republic breached or did not breach the Treaty, and is or is 
not liable for damages towards Mr. Lauder.
70
 
Once again, while this assertion was true formally, it does not comport 
with the dissonant reality that the conflicting awards in these parallel 
proceedings produced. 
One fascinating element present in the CME Final Award is an explicit 
reference and reliance upon the Lauder tribunal.  Specifically, the CME 
tribunal asserts that the Lauder tribunal essentially waived aside the risk of 
conflicting decisions: 
This holding of the Tribunal is supported by the London [Lauder] 
Tribunal’s findings, according to which the Respondent’s recourse in 
the London [Lauder] Arbitration to the principle of lis alibi pendens 
was held to be of no use, since all the other court and arbitration 
proceedings involved different parties and different causes of 
actions.  The London [Lauder] Tribunal considered the risk that the 
two Tribunals may decide differently.  It identified the risk that 
damages could be concurrently granted by more than one court or 
arbitral tribunal, in which case the amount of damages granted by the 
second deciding court or arbitral tribunal could take this fact into 
consideration when addressing the final damage . . . . It did not see 
an issue in differing decisions, which is a normal fact of forensic life, 
when different parties litigate the same dispute (which is not 
 
68 Id.  ¶¶ 432–33, at 182. 
69 See Lauder, supra note 57, ¶ 77, at 51. 
70 Id. ¶ 171, at 68. 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:419 (2012) 
438 
necessarily the case in all respects in this arbitration).
71
 
In fact, however, the Lauder tribunal did express some concern with 
respect to the possibility of conflicting decisions, but ultimately relied upon 
a rather formalistic rationale: 
There might exist the possibility of contradictory findings of this 
Arbitral Tribunal and the one set up to examine the claims of CME 
against the Czech Republic under the Dutch-Czech Bilateral 
Investment treaty.  Obviously, the claimants in the two proceedings 
are not identical.  However, this Arbitral Tribunal understands that 
the claim of Mr. Lauder giving rise to the present proceeding was 
commenced before the claims of CME was raised and, especially, the 
Respondent itself did not agree to a de facto consolidation of the two 




That the Lauder tribunal referenced the first-filed principle to assuage 
its concerns of the very real possibility of “contradictory findings” not only 
elevates procedural niceties, but also should have served as a shot across the 
CME tribunal’s bow.  Essentially, the Lauder tribunal sought to establish its 
primary jurisdiction on the basis of its chronological precedence. 
Despite the extensive analysis of the tribunals, the proceedings were 
substantively identical.  Indeed, before examining the Czech Republic’s res 
judicata and lis pendens arguments, the tribunal in CME candidly 
acknowledged that the Lauder arbitration “in substance dealt with the same 
dispute that is the object of these proceedings.”
73
  Nevertheless, the 
mechanical analysis of both tribunals—standing in stark contrast to the 
substantive/transactional approach that we advocate—demonstrably failed 
to address the novel circumstance.  Given the rapid proliferation of 
investment treaties and the increasingly complex nature of international 
corporate structures, the consequences of this failure, and the implications 
of these decisions “will not remain an isolated incident.”
74
 
B.  Southern Bluefin Tuna and the Emergence of a 
Substantive/Transactional Approach in UNCLOS Arbitration 
In contrast to the classical formalism that the tribunals in the Czech 
Republic Cases employed, the tribunal in the 1982 United Nations 
 
71 CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 434 (citing Lauder, supra note 57, ¶¶ 171–72, 
174, at 68 & 69). 
72  Lauder, supra note 57, ¶ 173, at 69 (emphasis added). 
73 CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 25, at  95–96. 
74 August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural 
Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes, 3 LAW & PRACTICE OF INT’L 
COURTS & TRIBUNALS 37, 41 (2004). 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arbitration widely referred to 
as the Southern Bluefin Tuna case adopts a refreshingly resourceful 
approach, much akin to the substantive/transactional test advocated for in 
this article.
75
  Essentially, the tribunal was confronted with a circumstance 
in which two separate treaties, UNCLOS and the Convention for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), seemingly applied to the 
matter, yet provided differing dispute resolution terms.  Even though the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna tribunal was not confronted with res judicata or lis 
pendens, its analysis nevertheless relied strongly on both of those concepts.  
Instead of focusing on procedural niceties and distinguishing between the 
two treaties with which it was confronted, the tribunal instead looked 
directly to the substance of the claim: 
The Tribunal accepts Article 16 of the [CCSBT] . . . as an agreement 
by the Parties to seek settlement of the instant dispute by peaceful 
means of their own choice.  It so concludes even though it has held 
that this dispute, while centered in the . . .  [CCSBT], also implicates 
obligations under UNCLOS.  It does so because the Parties to this 
dispute—the real terms of which have been defined above—are the 
same Parties grappling not with two separate disputes but with what 
in fact is a single dispute arising under both Conventions.  To find 
that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under UNCLOS 




Its conclusion that treating the disputes under the UNCLOS and 
CCSBT as distinct would be artificial is arresting, if only for its simple and 
manifest rationality. 
Although some have construed this decision narrowly, concluding that 
it largely applies to the second prong of the triple identity test (identity of 
grounds or subject matter),
77
 the substantive/transactional approach adopted 
by the tribunal also lends itself to a broader construction that can be applied 
to all prongs of the triple identity test.  This more flexible interpretation 
draws us ever closer to the U.S. common law analysis, which we suggest 
could serve as an effective model for the substantive/transactional approach. 
C.  Emerging Challenges in ICSID Arbitration:  Saipem, GEA Group, and 
the Rise of “Supervisory-Supervisory” Authority in Investor-State 
 
75 See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), Case No. 3 & 4, Award on 
Jurisdiction & Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2000). 
76 Id. ¶ 54, at 39. 
77 See Reinisch, supra note 74, at 64.  Compare Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. & N.Z. v. 
Japan), Case No. 3 & 4, Award on Jurisdiction & Admissibility on Aug. 4, 2000) with CME, 
Final Award, supra note 58 and Lauder, Final Award (demonstrating differences in the way 
that the court analyzed what constitute the same parties in Southern Bluefhin Tuna and the 
United States and Dutch BITs in the Czech Republic Cases). 
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Arbitration 
The immediacy of addressing the concerns involving supervisory-
supervisory authority arises from the award of the ICSID tribunal in Saipem 
S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh,
78
 and more recently, the 
ICSID award in GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine
79
 (GEA Group or 
GEA).  Even though considerable ink has been spilled analyzing this 
authority, more so in the case of the Saipem award, the issues raised in both 
of these proceedings have not been addressed within finality, a preclusion 
context, or within a res judicata framework.  Further, even though the 
Saipem award deservedly has garnered meaningful disapproval in the form 
of academic critique, the tribunal in GEA Group almost regrettably limits 
its disavowance, as shall be discussed in detail, to technical grounds framed 
by the very narrow issues that the parties presented in GEA Group, and 
based upon drawing factual but not conceptual distinctions. 
Professor Reisman aptly has written that, “Saipem if ultimately 
cautious in its holding, is, nonetheless far-reaching in its implications, for it 
adapts the mechanisms of international investment law as expressed in 
bilateral investment treaties, to serve as a review of the proper discharge by 
national courts of their responsibilities under the New York Convention.”
80
  
In this way, Professor Reisman conceptualizes the novel role that the 
tribunal in Saipem has carved out for international tribunals as supervisory-
supervisory fora.   
Extrapolating just ever so slightly on Professor Reisman’s 
observations, the Saipem award, despite being cloaked with the mantle of a 
very narrow and singular ruling limited only and exclusively to an 
extraordinarily particular set of facts, has the practical and theoretical 
effects of:  (i) wresting from municipal courts their normative obligations 
with respect to the New York Convention; (ii) transforming and deforming 
international tribunals into second-instance appellate venues sitting in 
judgment of the manner in which municipal courts process applications for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; (iii) substantially 
limiting the scope of the New York Convention; (iv) fashioning a new 
category of “investments” under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention; (v) 
denaturalizing international commercial arbitration; (vi) providing more 
duplicative arbitral proceedings; and (vii) undermining the elementary 
precepts that underlie international arbitration generally. 
 
78 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/F 
rontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC529_En&caseId=C52. 
79 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, (Mar. 
31, 2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases 
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440. 
80 W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 39 (2011). 
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A second commentator quite thoughtfully criticized Saipem for 
permitting commercial arbitration cases  to be “dressed up” as investor-state 
treaty disputes.
81
  Reflecting on Saipem, post-GEA Group, certain 
commentators have ventured to opine that Saipem is hardly “precedent.”  In 
a very carefully considered commentary, it was noted that “[a]s far as 
precedent goes, the Saipem decision has proved to be controversial.”
82
  The 
author explains how subsequent tribunals “have tended to tread very 
carefully to avoid being seen as sitting in judgment over the decisions of 
national courts and performing the role of a supra-national appellate 
body”
83




The numerous debilities and uncertainties incident to the very doctrine 
of precedent in investor-state arbitration calls into question whether, 
doctrinally, the issues that the Saipem award raises should be addressed and 
discussed within the parameters of the law of precedent.  If transparency 
and certainty are to be taken seriously, this dialogue must be had pursuant 
to a different doctrinal construct.  It is here that the principle of res judicata 
becomes determinative.  In addition, the most recent ICSID award to date 
that addresses Saipem and that is bottomed on analogous averments—GEA 
Group—at least from a procedural posture and pursuant to petitioner’s 
averments, falls far short from conceptually disavowing Saipem. 
1.  Saipem v. Bangladesh 
The claimant, Saipem S.p.A (Saipem), on February 14, 1990, executed 
a contract with The Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corp. (Petrobangla), a 
state entity.  The contract’s objective was to build a pipeline of 400 
kilometers for purposes of transporting condensate and gas to locations in 
the northeast section of Bangladesh.  Significantly, the project was to be 
completed by a certain date, but was materially delayed.  The causes for the 
delay were attributed to a dispute between the parties, and after negotiated 
extensions, disagreement concerning compensatory damages arising from 
the delays precipitated the filing of an arbitration request on June 7, 1993, 
consonant with an arbitral clause calling for ICC arbitration. 
Despite Petrobangla’s unsuccessful application to multiple tribunals 
seeking revocation of the ICC proceeding and a stay, on April 30, 2001, the 
ICC tribunal resumed proceedings and finally issued an award 
approximately two years later on May 9, 2003.  The tribunal held that 
 
81 Ruth Teitelbaum, Case Report on Saipem v. Bangladesh, 26 ARB. INT’L 313 (2010). 
82 Promod Nair, State Responsibility for Non-Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Revisiting 
Saipem Two Years On, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Aug. 25, 2011), http://kluwerarbitration 
blog.com/blog/2011/08/25/state-responsibility-for-non-enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-revisi 
ting-saipem-two-years-on/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
 83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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Petrobangla had breached its contractual obligation to compensate Saipem 
for the time extension and additional work and ordered Petrobangla to pay 




The Bangladeshi courts annulled the ICC award, and on October 5, 
2004, Saipem filed a request for arbitration with the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes.  The tribunal ruled in Saipem’s favor 
and observed: 
After having carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties in 
having taken into account all the circumstances of the case, and in 
particular the fact that the expropriation rites at hand were Saipem’s 
residual contractual rights under the investment as crystallized in the 
ICC Award . . . the Tribunal considers that in the present case the 
amount awarded by the ICC Award constitutes the best valuation of 
the compensation due under the Chorzów Factory principle.
86
 
By adopting the amount awarded by the ICC tribunal in the underlying 
arbitration award that the Bangladeshi courts vacated, the tribunal 
unavoidably highlighted the indivisibility of the two arbitration 
proceedings. 
2.  GEA Group v. Ukraine 
As in Saipem, the petitioner GEA Group entered into contractual 
relationships with Oriana, a state-owned (in this case Ukrainian) company, 
pursuant to which GEA Group
87
 would provide Oriana with 200,000 tons of 
NAPHTA fuel for conversion.
88
  Later agreements with Oriana relating to 
delivery of the “Conversion Contract” products were executed (a 
“Settlement Agreement” and a “Repayment Agreement”).  Unable to 
resolve indebtedness disputes resulting from the differences between those 
 
85 Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 48 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC529_En&case
Id=C52. 
86 Id. ¶ 202. 
87 Its predecessor in interest was Klöckner & Co. Aktiengesellschaft (referenced as “New 
Klöckner” throughout the award).  A recitation of relevant name changes and corporate 
mergers concerning GEA Group’s predecessors of interest is set forth with careful detail that 
includes a chart illustrating the various partnerships, subsidiaries and operative relationships 
between and among these predecessors.  GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶¶ 32–43 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH& 
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440. 
88 See id. ¶ 44.  During a two-year time frame (between 1996 and 1998) the operative 
contract for the provision of the NAPTHA fuel for conversion (“Conversion Contract”) was 
significantly amended (147 out of a total of 154 amendments). 
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products that should have been delivered and those products that either 
actually were delivered or that were then available for delivery gave rise to 
an ICC arbitration against Oriana.
89
  The tribunal entered an award in the 
GEA Group’s favor in the amount of USD $30,381,661.44 for 




GEA’s application to the Appellate Court of the Ivano-Frankivsk 
Region was unavailing on the ground that Oriana was not duly authorized 




Consonant with Saipem’s strategy, GEA Group filed an arbitration 
against Ukraine pursuant to the BIT between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Ukraine.
92
  Significantly, the tribunal primarily ruled in 
Ukraine’s favor and against GEA Group on four distinct grounds following 
a classical analysis and never considering, even in “dicta,” a claim 
preclusion theory. 
First, the tribunal analyzed the ICC award as the third category of 
averred investments comprising claimant’s basis for relief.
93
  Focusing on 
the criteria of Article 1 of the BIT or Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, it 
reasoned that “the ICC Award—in and of itself—cannot constitute an 
‘investment.’  Properly analyzed, it is a legal instrument, which provides for 
the disposition of rights and obligations arising out of the Settlement 
Agreement and Repayment Agreement (neither of which was itself an 
‘investment’). . . .”
94
 
Indeed, the grammatical structure and syntax establishes that the 
tribunal ruled that the award—in and of itself—cannot constitute an 
investment, only because it rests on instruments that themselves in turn do 
not constitute investments.  The tribunal, highlighting claimant’s reliance 
 
89 Id. ¶¶ 51–52, 56–57. 
90 Id. ¶ 62. 
91 The Appellate Court ruled: “Considering the case, the court ascertained that the 
[Repayment Agreement] was concluded and signed in contradiction to the Ukrainian 
effective legislation by the representatives of OJSC “‘Oriana’ without duly authorized 
powers.”  Id. ¶ 65.  Following a series of appeals, the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected 
GEA’s cassation complaint.  Id. ¶ 67. 
92 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Ukraine über die 
Förderung und den  gegenseitigen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen [Agreement between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of 
Investments], Ger.–Ukr.,  Feb. 15, 1993, ICSID Rep v. 5. 
93 The tribunal observed that “[t]he Claimant argues that the ICC Award, in and of itself, 
falls under Article 1(1)(c) of the BIT because it liquidated the amount due under the 
Settlement Agreement and Repayment Agreement as of 2002.”  GEA Group 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶ 159 (Mar. 31, 2011), 
availalable at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action 
Val=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440. 
94 Id. ¶ 161. 
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on Saipem, stated that the tribunal in that case fashioned propositions that 
are “difficult to reconcile,” such that: 
the ICC arbitration is part of the investment (under the heading: “Has 
Saipem made an investment under Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention?’); that the ICC Award is not part of the investment 
(under the heading: “Does the dispute arise directly out of the 
Investment?”); and that it is unnecessary to decide whether the ICC 
award is part of the investment (under the heading “Jurisdictional 
objections under the BIT”).”
95
 
However, it never entertained a preclusive effect theory or doctrine.
96
 
Second, addressing the parties’ contentions as to expropriation, the 
tribunal engaged in a contra-factual analysis and notably refrained either 
from (i) flatly disagreeing with the Saipem award on conceptual grounds 
(i.e., under no reasonable analysis should a commercial arbitration award 
constitute an investment and an unsuccessful enforcement action a taking), 
or (ii) engaging in a doctrinally preclusive exegesis.  Instead, it proceeded 
to distinguish Saipem in an unremarkable common-law like analysis. 
After disagreeing with the Saipem tribunal’s analysis,
97
 it identified a 
“discriminatory law” standard and found that: 
contrary to Saipem, the Tribunal has been presented with no 
evidence that the actions taken by the Ukrainian courts were 
“egregious” in any way; that they amounted to anything other than 
 
95 Id. ¶ 163. 
96 See id. ¶¶ 163–64. 
97 The GEA Group tribunal summarized the Saipem analysis as follows: 
In Saipem, the Bangladeshi courts annulled an ICC Award in Saipem’s favour.  In 
¶ 133 of its award, the tribunal stated that setting aside an arbitral award cannot, in 
and of itself, amount to an expropriation: 
[T]he Tribunal agrees with the parties that the substantial deprivation of 
Saipem’s ability to enjoy the benefits of the ICC Award is not sufficient to 
conclude that the Bangladeshi courts’ intervention is tantamount to an 
expropriation.  If this were true, any setting aside of an award could then 
found a claim for expropriation, even if the setting aside was ordered by the 
competent state court upon legitimate grounds. 
The tribunal then concluded that, based on the circumstances of that case, the non-
enforcement of the ICC Award amounted to an expropriation due to the 
particularly egregious nature of the acts of the Bangladeshi courts. 
 
The Claimant attempts in this case [GEA Group] to deploy this standard, 
contending that Ukraine committed “a travesty of justice in applying a 
discriminatory law to avoid enforcement of GEA’s Award.” 
Id. ¶¶ 233–35. 
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the application of Ukrainian law; or that they were somehow 




Third, as to a violation of fair and equitable treatment, again after 
restating that it already had found that the ICC Award itself did not 
constitute an investment, the tribunal, applying the Mondev International 




[it] does not have any “justified concerns as to the judicial propriety 
of the outcome” of the decisions of the Ukrainian courts in view of 
“generally accepted standards of the administration of justice.”  
Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that there is nothing “clearly 
improper and discreditable” with respect to those decisions, with the 
result that the Claimant’s claim that, if the ICC Award would have 
been considered an investment, its investment has not been subject to 
fair and equitable treatment is rejected.
100
 
Fourth and finally, the tribunal’s application of the National Treatment 
and Most Favored Nation standards is equally disappointing because of its 
narrow methodology.  It merely sought to distinguish factually GEA 
Group’s reliance on the claims of the Seychelles Company that were 
adjudicated in Regent Company v. Ukraine.
101
  Here the emphasis on 
merely distinguishing the case could not be more glaring.  The GEA Group 
award in relevant part reads: 
 
98 Id. ¶ 236. 
99 At paragraph 312, the tribunal states: 
The test is not whether a particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or 
surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified 
concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome, bearing in mind on the one 
hand that international tribunals are not courts of appeal, and on the other hand that 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA (like other treaties for the protection of investments) is 
intended to provide a real measure of protection.  In the end the question is 
whether, at an international level and having regard to generally accepted 
standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all 
the available facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and 
discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and 
inequitable treatment.  This is admittedly a somewhat open-ended standard, but it 
may be that in practice no more precise formula can be offered to cover the range 
of possibilities. 
Id. ¶ 312 (quoting Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSD Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004). 
100 Id. ¶ 319. 
101 Regent Co. v. Ukraine, Application No. 773/03, EUR Ct. H.R. (2008), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=
773/03&sessionid=86286133&skin=hudoc-en (emphasis in original). 
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With respect to the purported unequal treatment between the 
Claimant and the Seychelles company, the Tribunal is not convinced 
that the situation of the Seychelles company is comparable to that of 
GEA.  In the Tribunal’s view, the simple fact that the claim of the 
Seychelles company was not time-barred does not, in and of itself, 
mean anything in particular taking into account the differences in the 
procedural posture between that case and the one at hand.
102
 
Following this line of thinking, the tribunal found analytical support in 
drawing a distinction between the pre-investment and post-investment 
strictures of Article 6 of the Law on Foreign Economic Activities.  It thus 
observed that while this particular legislation indeed imposes on foreigners 
greater obstacles to investment than it does with respect to nationals, the 
post-investment regime applies equally and in the same manner to both 
nationals and foreigners, a distinction that in itself exalts form over 
substance.  Both arguments taken in tandem, distinguishing the immediate 
investor from the Seychelles Company claimant and reconciling the 
asymmetries as to Article 6, facilitated rejection of GEA Group’s claim that 
it was discriminated against in violation of Article 3 of the BIT.
103
 
It would be misguided to conclude that the tribunal in GEA Group was 
right for the wrong reasons.  In the final analysis, the tribunal reached its 
holding by timidly finding that “the ICC Award—in and of itself—cannot 
constitute an investment.”
104
  This statement, however, cannot be severed 
from its syntax.  It ultimately proceeded to qualify the proposition by 
conceptually connecting the premise to the underlying facts of the case—
namely that the award “provides for the disposition of rights and obligations 
arising out of the Settlement Agreement and Repayment Agreement 
(neither of which was itself an investment). . . .”
105
   
The analysis in GEA Group is disappointing.  Specifically, it did not 
go far enough, and dared not, at least in part, premise its findings and ruling 
on the inevitable and necessary consequences of denaturalizing the 
underlying international commercial arbitration and transforming it into an 
investor–state dispute.  At the same time, it enshrined treaty-based 
arbitrations as sitting in judgment of the conduct of national courts and their 
application of the New York Convention—a framework that undermines 
both international commercial arbitration and investor–state arbitration. 
The logical corollary to the tribunal’s narrow investment analysis is 
that an ICC Award, when tested against the criteria of the applicable article 
of the BIT at issue or Article 25 of the ICSID Convention—in and of 
 
102  GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶ 
342 (Mar. 31, 2011), availalable at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440. 
103 Id. ¶¶ 344–45. 
104 Id. ¶ 161 (internal quotation omitted). 
105 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
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itself—shall constitute an investment.  That is true so long as, when 
properly analyzed, the award provides for the dispositions of rights and 
obligations arising out of legal instruments that—in and of themselves—
properly constitute “investments” under the standard of the operative BIT 
or Article 5 of the Convention. 
Quite remarkably, both Saipem (reaching a wrong result but based on a 
contradictory analysis that in general terms acknowledges the folly of 
having a commercial arbitration award constitute an investment under a 
BIT) and GEA Group (reaching a correct result but on a weak analysis that 
conceptually, contingent on the happenstance of a fact pattern, leaves open 
the possibility for the recognition as a principle of international law that an 
international commercial arbitral award may constitute an investment 
pursuant to a BIT and within the purview of Article 25 of the Convention) 
are narrowly tailored opinions that leave much to be desired.  The undue 
emphasis on specificity is not helpful for other tribunals that will continue 
to face the same aberrant procedural configuration.  Therefore, both awards 
contribute to the possibility, and now likelihood, of duplicative arbitration, 
protracted proceedings, uncertainty, and a diminished view of national 
courts under the New York Convention.  They have also likely contributed 
to greater costs and inefficiencies in international arbitration.  The time-
honored precepts of party autonomy, predictability, uniformity, 
transparency of standard, and efficiency, were not best served by either 
award, notwithstanding the GEA Group award’s ruling. 
Both awards highlight the need for the application of a res judicata 
doctrine to investor–state arbitration.  The uncertain status of the role of 
precedent in international arbitration additionally buttresses the need for the 
application of a res judicata doctrine. 
To be sure, the application of res judicata, particularly in the context of 
investor–state arbitration, certainly is not without its challenges.  Most 
notably, the further case (i.e. the investor–state arbitration that follows an 
international commercial arbitration, where recognition and enforcement 
were denied) almost of necessity will not meet the same parties prong of 
the triple identity test.  An expansive iteration of the doctrine premised on a 
substantive/transactional standard would be responsive to this specific 
obstacle.  The res judicata doctrine would obviate the waste, time, and 
inefficiencies that even a surface analysis of both Saipem and GEA Group 
reveals, as neither proceeding justified a full merits hearing.  Thus, while 
productive for the arbitrators and the lawyers, the non-application of the 
doctrine was a disservice to the parties and to arbitration generally.  The 
very fact that res judicata, albeit different species of the doctrine, is 
universally accepted and codified as applicable to international commercial 
arbitration should herald the use of the doctrine in investor–state disputes.  
However, only an expansive substantive/transactional version of the 
doctrine akin to that explored here, and pursuant to the U.S. common law 
paradigm, would meaningfully address the singular issues endemic to 
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investor–state arbitration. 
The treatment of an international commercial arbitration award as an 
investment far exceeds the already immense consequences of elevating a 
commercial contractual dispute into an international treaty-based contention 
governed by international public law.  It, in effect, represents an extreme 
application of an omnibus umbrella clause, as it incorporates directly and 
explicitly non-treaty premised contractual causes of action and, therefore, 
incident defenses and affirmative defenses as well.  This phenomenon 
should not and cannot be analyzed as an aberrant doctrinal development 
occurring in a void that is filled by the particularity of an isolated dispute—
one that may give rise to the premises from which counsel and arbitrators 
alike may infer a new category of investment (i.e., an actual commercial 
arbitration award). 
Quite the contrary, it is but the continuation of a well-defined and 
discernable trend that aspires to the “internationalization of state-contracts.”  
Pursuant to this school of thought, an expansive and non-restrictive reading 
of bilateral investment treaties is encouraged so as to maximize the panoply 
of doctrinal protections accorded to investors at the price of limiting the 
host state’s (typically a capital importing country) regulatory ambit.  This 
theory seeks to promote the purported stability of state contracts by 
removing them from the sphere of municipal law (i.e., that of the host 
state).  In turn, it advocates for the importation of “principles of 
international law” into the arena of investor–state disputes so that investors’ 
rights are protected beyond the doctrinal gamut embodied in investment 
protection treaties. 
The net effect is the wholesale importation of private international law 
doctrine into public international law, which far exceeds the expectations of 
the contracting parties who sought equal and equitable bilateralism or 
multilateralism in negotiating, executing, and implementing investment 
treaties.  An international investment treaty, at least from a theoretical 
configuration, aspires to symmetry/parity between the member contracting 
states with respect to protection.  This aspiration is fundamentally frustrated 
when contractual claims are brought before international tribunals and 
international arbitral tribunals are charged with the imperative of overseeing 
the propriety of compliance with mere contractual obligations and, in many 
instances, pre-entry investment representations.
106
  The expansive review of 
international investment treaties and the attribution of special normative 
status to state contracts render the workings of bilateral investment treaties 
wholly asymmetrical.  It is true that even the most rudimentary choice of 
law test when applied to state contracts would suggest that domestic law is 
applicable, certainly when measured by place of performance, location of 
resources, negotiation, and collateral effects.  However, the dual contention 
 
106 Admittedly, there is a paucity of authority finding a violation of a treatment standard 
based upon pre-entry investment treatment violations. 
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that a state contract is quasi-public and entails an arguably international 
obligation has been deemed dispositive in removing the doctrinally 
applicable host state’s substantive law from representing even a partially 
determinative element of the analysis.  Instead, international principles are 
applied, without sustained explanation, with respect to significant queries 
that need to be addressed. 
By way of example, it can be argued that there is no single 
comprehensive body of international public law addressing substantive 
principles of contract law.  In this same vein, the selection of “applicable 
international law principles” is not guided by any single criteria, and 
therefore, by necessity is rendered circumstantial and arbitrary.  In the 
selection of these principles often the penchant of arbitrators who seek to 
promote investment protection despite the need to safeguard the host state’s 
regulatory sphere prevails as a decisive factor in this exercise of “principle 
selection.”  Despite the legal fiction that state contracts are somehow quasi-
public, claims asserted by multinational corporations should not be allowed 
to elevate principles of private international law so that they may attain 
treaty status.  It is legitimate to inquire whether a private entity or natural 
person would even have sufficient international standing or personality to 
modify the scope of treaties negotiated and executed by contracting states 
and not individuals.  Can a private entity or natural person have standing to 
contest a purely commercial contractual dispute in an arena of public 
international law?  Should multinational corporations be accorded authority 
to amend treaty claims to include commercial causes of action arising from 
non-investments in the realm of private international law? 
It would be a mistake to read Saipem v. Bangladesh and GEA v. 
Ukraine as idiosyncratic cases, narrowly tailored to their facts.  The demise 
of traditional conceptions of sovereignty fosters both the expansive 
construction of international investment treaties and the importation of 
international law principles into the substantive law arena of disputes 
concerning state contracts. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Economic globalization commands a juridical counterpart in the field 
of international dispute resolution.  International arbitration serves that 
function and will continue to do so until such time as transnational tribunals 
of civil procedure come into being.  The uncertain nature and application of 
the doctrine of precedent—stare decisis—in international arbitration 
underscores the immediate need (i) for application of a transnational res 
judicata doctrine, and (ii) uniformity in the elements and application of the 
doctrine.  Regrettably, although universally accepted, the doctrine in its 
current status is fragmented because it is territorially based and ill-suited for 
use in an environment of economic globalization that aspires to be 
monolithic, at least with respect to the scope of a global market economy 
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that finds no historical precedent. 
Even among civil law jurisdictions the basic elements of the triple 
identity test vary significantly.  The nature and character of this fragmented 
civil law regime are made worse by the disparities between it and the 
configuration of the doctrine in common law jurisdictions, particularly U.S. 
common law.  Such rudimentary questions as the extent to which res 
judicata is a matter of public policy that may be raised by a decision maker 
sua sponte, whether the doctrine applies to the ruling or disposit only and 
not the grounds or reasons underlying, as well as if, how, and to whom it 
applies in the context of non-parties are essential to the uniform application 
of the doctrine.  Attendant to these irregularities are equally fundamental 
disparities among nations between the plain language of the codified 
doctrine and the actual practice in its application, not to mention virtually 
endless permutations of each element of the triple identity test. 
The U.S. common law version of res judicata may serve as a 
substantial conceptual bastion from which civil law and common law res 
judicata precepts may merge in fashioning a uniform doctrine that is 
expansive, substantive/transactional-based as to criteria, and non-formalistic 
in its application so as to avert and discourage the doctrine’s circumvention 
through the use of legal fictions.  This expansive version of the doctrine is 
particularly well-suited to address the complexities of applying res judicata 
in the context of investor–state arbitration.  This is demonstrated by the 
conflicting lines of awards in Saipem and GEA Group, together with the 
paucity of conceptual development that both tribunals exemplified in 
addressing unvarnished examples of duplicative arbitrations that never 
should have been brought in the first instance, which only served to fuel 
flames that were always smoldering.  The non-application of the doctrine to 
investor–state arbitrations, among other concerns, denaturalizes (i) 
international commercial arbitration, (ii) treaty-based arbitration, and (iii) 
the rule of domestic courts and their responsibilities under the New York 
Convention.  The doctrine is ripe for development. 
